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interests, provide a proactive forward deployed stance against the Global War 
On Terrorism (GWOT), and better execute crisis resource contingency 
operations throughout the entire continent of Africa. 
Thus, this thesis will argue that given the continued focus on the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT), the United States should consider establishing a 
future political-military organization such as a unified or sub-unified African 
Regional Combatant Command (ARCC) and a Regional African Special 
Operations Command (RA-SOC) to both promote democratic initiatives and 
regional stability within the region, and to better assist and support U.S. national 
security interests by deterring and defeating international and regional terrorist 
networks well away from US borders. 
This newly proposed organization, at a minimum, should have a forward 
deployed political-military element positioned and located somewhere within the 
region of Sub-Saharan African.  Specifically, this thesis will recommend that this 
proposed forward deployed regional headquarters should strategically be located 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM............................................................ 1 
B. PURPOSE............................................................................................ 3 
C. SIGNIFICANCE.................................................................................... 4 
D. METHODOLOGY................................................................................. 5 
E. OVERVIEW .......................................................................................... 6 
II. THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF AFRICA ............................................ 9 
A.  THE UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY IN AFRICA ............... 9 
1. Strategic and Regional Vision ................................................ 9 
2. Securing Strategic Energy Resources................................. 10 
3. Shaping Democracy By, With, and Through Regional 
Security .................................................................................. 11 
B. THE STABILITY CHALLENGES FOR AFRICA ................................ 15 
1. The Threat of Regional Terrorist Environments ................. 17 
2. Stopping Radical and Extremist Violence ........................... 20 
3. Size and Shape of Geography Effects Regional Security 
and Stability ........................................................................... 22 
C. CORRECTING U.S. DEPARTMENTAL AND REGIONAL FLAWS... 23 
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND..................................................................... 29 
A. AFRICA AND THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE UNITED 
STATES UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN (UCP) .................................... 29 
B. THE CREATION OF USEUCOM AND NORTH AFRICA .................. 30 
1. U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM) and the Creation of 
MEAFSAIO (Middle East, Africa South of the Sahara, and 
South Asia, and the Indian Ocean)....................................... 31 
2. U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) and MEAFSA..... 33 
3. U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) and the Rapid 
Deployment Joint Task Force............................................... 34 
C. THE CREATION OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM) .. 35 
D. UNITED STATES REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR AFRICA................ 37 
IV. THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN AFRICAN STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT... 43 
A. THE STRATEGIC REQUIREMENT TO CREATE A SUB-UNIFIED 
REGIONAL COMMAND AND HEAD-QUARTERS FOR AFRICA .... 43 
B. NEW SYNERGIES ............................................................................. 46 
C. U.S. NATIONAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AFRICA 
AND THE FUTURE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (GWOT) ....... 48 
1. Change USEUCOM’s, USCENTCOM’s, and USPACOM’s 
Geographical Area Of Responsibility (AOR) within Africa. 48 
2. Recommend an Increase for Supporting African Union 
(AU) Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations in 
Support of U.S.-African National Interests .......................... 53 
 viii
V. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 57 
APPENDIX .............................................................................................................. 61 
DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................... 61 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 63 






LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1. Africa’s Multiple Regional Economic Groups.  Africa Recovery: 
Volume 16, No. 2-3 September 2002 published by the U.N. Dept. of 
Public Information, New York. Retrieved Feb. 04, 2005 from 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol16no2/map.pdf .......... 13 
Figure 2. Illustration diagram during course instruction by Professor, Dr. John 
Arquilla, illustrating ”The Historical and Future Dilemmas of 
Unconventional Wars” at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California ........................................................................... 16 
Figure 3. The U.S. National Security Strategy For Combating Terrorism 
illustrating “The Structures Of Terror” (NSS), 2003 ............................ 18 
Figure 4. Department of State (DoS): The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.  
Regional responsibility and list of countries along the Maghreb and 
Middle East.  Map illustration was retrieved August 17, 2005 from 
the Internet at http://www.state.gov/p/nea .......................................... 25 
Figure 5. Department of State (DoS): The Bureau of African Affairs.  
Regional responsibility and list of countries within Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Map illustration was retrieved August 17, 2005 from the 
Internet at http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/............................................... 25 
Figure 6. The I983 Combatant Commander’s regional Area of 
Responsibilities (AOR) for Africa, 2000(Parameters, No. 30, US 
Army War College Quarterly (Winter 2000-2001). “A CINC for Sub-
Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan.” by 
Richard G. Catoire. (Pages 102-117). Retrieved Feb. 04, 2005 from 
http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00winter/catoire.htm ..................... 28 
Figure 7. The Commander’s Area of Responsibility. The 2003-2004 
USSOCOM SOF Posture Statement.  Retrieved on September 5th, 
2005, from the Internet from DoD SOLIC website at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic/asd_bio.html from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic/2003_2004_SOF_Posture_S
tatement.pdf ....................................................................................... 29 
Figure 8. Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI). African Data 
Dissemination Service (ADDS). NASA NDVI Image Produced By: 
USGS-EROS Data Center. Retrieved Feb. 04, 2005 from 
http://igskmncnwb015.cr.usgs.gov/adds/imgbrowses2.php?adds=&i
mage=nd&extent=af ........................................................................... 33 
Figure 9. Current Commander’s area of responsibility for Africa, 2000. 
Parameters, No. 30, US Army War College Quarterly (Winter 2000-
2001). “A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified 
Command Plan.” by Richard G. Catoire. (Pages 102-117). 
Retrieved Feb. 04, 2005 from http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00winter/catoire.htm ..................... 37 
 x
Figure 10. A proposed Africa Command area of responsibility, 1997.  
Parameters, No. 27, US Army War College Quarterly (Winter 1997-
1998). By Catoire, Richard G., “US Strategy for Africa: A CINC for 
Sub-Saharan Africa?”.  Parameters: US Army War College 
Quarterly, Volume. XXX, No. Winter 2001.......................................... 41 
Figure 11. The African Union (AU) The Recognized Five African Geographical 
Sub-Regions.  Retrieved on 08/08-05 from the Internet at 
http;//www.africanaction.org/bp/regional.htm...................................... 45 
Figure 12. The Commander’s Area of Responsibility. The 2003-2004 
USSOCOM SOF Posture Statement.  Retrieved on September 5, 
2005, from the Internet from DoD SOLIC website at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic/asd_bio.html from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic/2003_2004_SOF_Posture_S
tatement.pdf ....................................................................................... 48 
Figure 13. This author’s changes after the Commander’s Area of 
Responsibility. The 2003-2004 USSOCOM SOF Posture 
Statement.  Retrieved on September 5, 2005, from the Internet 
from DoD SOLIC website at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic/asd_bio.html from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic/2003_2004_SOF_Posture_S
tatement ............................................................................................. 49 
Figure 14. This author’s changes after the Commander’s Area of 
Responsibility. The 2003-2004 USSOCOM SOF Posture 
Statement.  Retrieved on September 5, 2005, from the Internet 
from DoD SOLIC website at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic/asd_bio.html from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic/2003_2004_SOF_Posture_S
tatement ............................................................................................. 51 
Figure 15. Africa Political (Origination of this graphic illustration is unknown by 
















II Samuel 1:23 
 
I would like to dedicate this thesis to all the men and women who have 
dedicated all or have given an invaluable portion of their lives through their 
combined humanitarian efforts toward helping and assisting the people, 
societies, and the many critical natural environments within the beautiful 
continent of Africa.  I also personally would like to recognize the man and women 
who have given their lives for protecting this great nation, the United States of 
America, and for their ultimate individual sacrifices for defending this country.  
May we never forget September 11, 2001.  
Most importantly, I personally would like to thank my thesis advisors Dr. 
Anna Simons (DA) and Professor George Lober (DA) for their professional and 
personal commitment, guidance, leadership, and continued friendship. I would 
like to recognize and individually thank all of the outstanding Department of 
Defense (DA) professors: Dr. Gordon McCormick (Chairman, DA), Dr. Letitia 
Lawson (NSA), Dr John Arquilla (DA), Dr. Douglas Borer (DA), Professor Peter 
Gustaitis (DA) Prof. Dr. Frank Giordano (DA), Dr. Dorothy Denning (DA), 
Professor Hy Rothstein (DA), Dr. David Tucker (DA), Dr. Glenn Robinson (DA), 
Dr. Erik Jansen (DA), Dr. Kalev Sepp (DA), and Dr. Robert O’Connell (DA).  A 
special recognition for the entire DA staff and administrators and most 
importantly Jennifer Duncan.  
I would like to recognize the men and women from the United States Army 
3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) and from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion 
(Airborne) for providing this author with information drawn from their personal 
and operational experiences, throughout the continent of Africa.  I would like to 
personally applaud and give an appreciation to Mr. Michael Tredway (Sergeant 
First Class, Retired).  Michael’s personal friendship and passion for Africa 
continues to inspire many of us to dedicate ourselves to assist Africa wherever 
and whenever possible. 
 xii
Our quality family time shared together here at the Naval Post Graduate 
School (NPS) has been a great family experience, especially with the birth of our 
son, Hudson in 2005.  California’s Monterey Peninsula will always be a 
significant memory for our family. 
 






















A. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM 
The focus of this thesis is the strategic problems that historically and 
geopolitically continue to affect Africa.  This thesis will propose the establishment 
of a unified or sub-unified African Regional Combatant Command.  This thesis 
will specifically look at Africa in terms of three areas of concern to the United 
States: U.S. national energy interests (i.e., energy resources and strategic 
minerals), the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT), and the political requirement 
for a committed U.S. military regional command structure. 
Unfortunately, the current Geographical Combatant Command (GCC) 
structures within Africa geo-politically continue to divide Africa by splitting 
economic and political regions, cultural zones, and economic trade areas, while 
fracturing U.S. military regional attention.  By having the existing three Regional 
Combatant Commands geographically, strategically, operationally, and tactically 
continue to divide the continent of Africa among U.S. Europe Command 
(USEUCOM), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific 
Command (USPACOM), the U.S. strategy and policy for Sub-Saharan African 
affairs continues to inadequately reflect the changing geo-political landscapes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa today. 
This thesis will recommend the establishment of either a unified or sub-
unified African Regional Combatant Command and a Regional African Special 
Operations Command to successfully support, assist, and advise current and 
future U.S. National Security strategies for the continent of Africa.  This single 
regional command and control headquarters would effectively support existing 
African regional and sub-regional economic institutions, influence future U.S.-
African democratic progress, build better political and military professional 
leadership, and effectively better support any crisis action planning or conflict 
resolution operations within Africa. 
Most importantly, this proposed African Regional Combatant Command 
and Regional African Special Operations Command will help support U.S. 
2 
national initiatives to strengthen, integrate, assist, coordinate, and support future 
U.S.-African democratic security cooperation throughout the region.  This single 
organization will be able to effectively plan and execute a regional political-
military strategy that should successfully accomplish regional and country team 
objectives. 
Finally, the creation of this new regional military organization would 
provide better strategic regional expertise, enhance cultural planning and 
operational advice, and better integrate cooperation among U.S. embassies, the 
Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD), as well as other 
U.S. departments and agencies that regionally focus on Africa.  This organization 
would effectively and efficiently place coordinated Military-to-Military and Civil-
Military relationships under the command and control of one unified or sub-
unified African regional geo-political-military headquarters that would in turn 
command responsibility and regional authority for the entire continent of Africa. 
This regional military command will need to be both focused and 
dedicated toward Africa and granted the appropriate U.S. military force structure 
in order to effectively command and control international, regional, and coalition 
supported Civil-Military Operations (CMO), Counterinsurgency (COIN), 
Counterterrorism (CT), Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HA), Peacekeeping 
Operations (PKO), Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO), as well as effectively 
support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) within Africa. 
This thesis will also identify the remarkable differences in approach 
between the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Defense (DoD) 
concerning initiatives in Africa.  The main argument that this thesis will present is 
that if the United States is going to be dedicated to Africa, then Africa should not 
continue to be sub-regionally divided between the Department of Defense’s 
(DoD’s) three Regional Combatant Commands.  If we are to be politically serious 
about Africa in this 21st Century, then there needs to be a strategic correction 
within the Unified Command Plan (UCP) that currently separates Africa geo-
politically between USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM.  In order to be 
3 
effective in Africa, the US will need to support African regionalism, and the US 




The purpose of the thesis is to identify and present a realistic approach for 
establishing and promoting future regional security and economic stability within 
Africa.  United States policy makers are going to have to begin a process that 
identifies how US foreign policy should shape and create a more positive 
environment for Africa in the near future.  The U.S. ideal seems to be to create 
improved regional security in order to assist African civil societies with 
democracy and reverse Africa’s poverty, eliminate threats from the AIDS 
pandemic, persuade African governments to address governmental corruption 
through public transparency, and increase human rights through encouraging 
ethnic and racial equality. 
In the near term, the US will need to encourage a dedicated long-term 
economic investment in African countries if they are to sustain and increase their 
regional security initiatives.  Since the early 1990’s and most recently with 
President Bush’s second term in office, the continent of Africa has become visibly 
important for U.S. national security strategy.  The U.S. has begun to heavily 
increase its national efforts in promoting democracy and economic development 
within Africa, waging the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT), providing for future 
U.S. energy security by tapping sources of energy in Africa, and by promoting 
prosperity and equality in general throughout the region. 
However, despite recent US economic relief and support, Africa is still 
considered a backburner region and U.S. foreign policy is still executed with a 
minimal integrated regional strategy.  In fact, many academics will argue that 
increased international debt relief and aid from the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) will continue to only further destabilize African 
state government capacity and lead to short-term economic fixes or relief within 
4 
the region.  With the recent increased discovery and production of new sources 
of oil within Sub-Saharan Africa, critics will also argue that, as in the Middle East, 
Africa may become a region of increased political violence.  With reference to the 
past regional crises which gathered steam in the 1990s, these ongoing conflicts 
will only continue to destabilize the region economically.  Africa’s historical 
legacies of numerous wars, humanitarian crises, and political violence continues.  
In truth, the continent remains affected by regional terrorism, insurgencies, tribal 
and ethnic violence, genocide, civil war, border disputes, disease, famine, 
governmental corruption and the inability to control ungoverned territories, 
religious violence, economic decline, and the possibility of more regional wars 
over highly lucrative energy resource rights and control. 
 
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
The time has come to stop treating Africa as a backwater region.  
Unfortunately, many Cold War attitudes and historical references still affect U.S.-
African political affairs (Schraeder, 1994, P 250). 
A version of the historical ‘Race for Africa” in the 19th Century is likely to 
recur again in this 21st Century with the discovery of vast new resources.  Since 
the 1990’s, the monumental discoveries of large potential energy sites located 
off-shore in the Gulf of Guinea and along the equatorial belt of west Africa are 
receiving tremendous attention from competing international investors and 
energy companies.  Sub-Saharan African countries in this region are becoming 
of strategic interest to the U.S. similar to the Middle East in the 1970’s and 
1980’s.  The US and other nations are competing against one another in order to 
secure joint energy discovery rights and provide advanced technology.  
Extensive economic programs, like the U.S.-African New Economic Policy for 
African Development (NEPAD), African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGAO) and 
the Millennium Challenge Accounts (MCA) which are directed towards limiting 





The findings and recommendations of the African Oil Policy Initiative 
Group (AOPIG) demonstrate that Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically the Gulf of 
Guinea region, will become a strategically significant location for future U.S. 
national interests.  Current U.S. national policies are still too tied to political and 
cultural legacies from the Cold War.  The U.S. needs to quickly adapt and 
reorganize in order to meet the current regional challenges that are affecting 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  The US will strategically need to combine all the elements 
of political, economic, and military power towards building a African regional 
focus and making a long-term, serious political-military commitment. 
The primary impetus for this thesis is to address the need to create either 
a unified or a sub-unified Regional African Combatant Command (RACC).  The 
conclusion of this thesis tracks with the recommendations that were presented by 
the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG).  The AOPIG members, along with 
Interagency and a Congressional Review Board, were comprised of numerous 
special representatives from the Department of State (DoS), Department of 
Energy (DoE), the House of Representative, the United States Senate, 
International consultants, major U.S. oil companies, and other U.S. investors.1 
In Chapter I, I will explain the ongoing problem with current U.S. strategy 
concerning Africa, and how geographic and foreign policy responsibilities are 
divided up.  Chapter II will review the historical, current, and future significance of 
Africa and U.S. national security interests.  Chapter III specifically describes how 
Africa has been affected by geo-strategic politics within the unified combatant 
command relationships under the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Unified 
Command Plan (UCP).  Chapter IV identifies the strategic requirement for a geo-
political re-alignment for Africa within the Department of Defense, specifically of 
the geographical combatant command boundaries and their areas of 
responsibility (AOR) within USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM.  Finally, 
Chapter V recommends strategic changes in order to correct historical and 
                                            
1 African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development. The African Oil 
and Policy Working Group (AOPIG), 4 
6 
current ineffective U.S. foreign policy.  In the conclusion I summarize why DoD 




The world continues to be an irregular environment that constantly 
changes as, following the Cold War, strategic alliances shift and become 
realigned.  Africa continues to be threatened by the economic impacts and 
environmental challenges of globalization.  The continued threats from 
international terrorism and intra-state insurgencies can now be considered the 
primary national security challenges for the U.S. for the foreseeable future.  Non-
state actors will continue to threaten and challenge the sovereignty and 
legitimacy of weak states where no effective government exists to control the 
territory and the population, a problem particularly plagues Africa. 
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has had new concerns 
about the threats posed by regional insecurity.  The United States has a national 
strategic interest in continued global economic development, the establishment 
of regional security and stability, and an increase in multilateral security 
cooperation.  Yet, in one of the most underdeveloped, least secure parts of the 
world, namely Africa, the “region” is organized and treated in ways that make 
little strategic sense from a 21st century American point of view. 
History has created a situation in Africa today that demands a more 
coherent long-term economic and security strategy.  This strategy can be 
achieved by both international partners and the U.S. through increased economic 
development, the promotion of democratic values, and strengthening 
organizations.  Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has been the only continent 
to continue to fall deeper into political unrest, ethnic violence, and continued 
governmental corruption.  History has shown that in Africa military intervention is 
a reactionary event.  Contingency operations and peacekeeping enforcement 
executed either by UN peacekeepers or multilaterally by the U.S. and European 
partners have been tactically successful, but for the most part remain ad hoc 
7 
events.  A long-term political-military strategy is needed in Africa in order to 
effectively engage in a preemptive strategic approach that ideally mitigates the 
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II. THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF AFRICA 
A.  THE UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY IN AFRICA 
1. Strategic and Regional Vision 
In the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld stated on March 1, 2005 that a 
strategic vision emphasizes the national importance of influencing regional 
events before they become significant challenges to the United States.  By 
preparing, establishing, and creating the strategic and regional environments 
most favorable to us today, the U.S. will be able to better confront these regional 
threats and irregular challenges in the future: 
We live in a time of unconventional challenges and strategic 
uncertainty.  We are confronting fundamentally different challenges 
from those by the American defense establishment in the Cold War 
and previous eras.  The strategy we adopt today will help influence 
the world’s strategic environment, for the United States is an 
unusually powerful player in world affairs.  President George W. 
Bush is committed to ensuring the security of the American people, 
strengthening the community of free nations, and advancing 
democracy reform, freedom, and economic well-being around the 
globe. 
The Department of Defense is implementing the President’s 
commitment to the forward defense of freedom as articulated in the 
National Security Strategy.  This National Defense Strategy outlines 
our approach to dealing with challenges we likely will confront, not 
just those we are currently best prepared to meet. Our intent is to 
transform how we think about security, formulate strategic 
objectives, and adapt to achieve success.2 
The United States will need to identify and prepare an attainable strategic 
vision that objectively and reasonably addresses the international and regional 
vitality of Sub-Saharan Africa.  The importance for America to have strategic 
access to critical foreign energy resources is a U.S. national interest.  Sub-
Saharan Africa is increasingly one such area as the U.S. begins to shift its 
                                            
2 The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. The Department of 
Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. March 01, 2005, Forward, 1-5 
10 
attention to investing in African oil and off-shore discovery technology within the 
Gulf of Guinea region especially.  The strategic value of African oil deposits and 
energy reserves will likely only become more significant as the Sub-Saharan 
African nations continue to allow foreign oil and energy companies to develop 
and discover these new sites. 
 
2. Securing Strategic Energy Resources 
Today, the U.S. currently receives an estimated 16 percent of its foreign 
oil imports from sub-Saharan Africa.3  Future projections by the National 
Intelligence Council conclude that the U.S. will get at least an estimated 25 
percent of it oil from Africa by the year 2015, thereby surpassing the share that 
comes from the Persian Gulf region. The vast majority of Africa’s oil is from the 
eastern Atlantic Ocean along the African coastline from Ghana to Nigeria, 
continuing down to Angola, in a region called the “Gulf of Guinea” or, historically, 
the colonial “Gold Coast”.  Many future discovery estimates are still largely 
undetermined, and many large U.S. energy companies have begun their “energy 
discovery race for Africa” in the hopes they will discover large reserves. 
The future oil capacity of this region it still considered largely unknown.  
The estimates suggest, however, that this region will produce enormous amounts 
of oil well into the next century.  Many oil experts predict that the Gulf of Guinea 
will become the world’s next global “oil sweet spot”.  This large equatorial region 
in Sub-Saharan Africa has become renowned for its quality of crude oil which 






                                            
3 DoD Strategy For Sub-Saharan Africa, 16 percent of all imported oil to the US comes from 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the majority of African Foreign Oil comes from the Gulf of Guinea region. 
Retrieved from the Internet on August 17, 2005 from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/isa/africa/africa_strategy_draft.pdf, August 2001, 2 
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3. Shaping Democracy By, With, and Through Regional Security 
The Department of State (DoS) combined with USAID (US Agency for 
International Development) have merged their economic development strategies 
for developmental assistance in Africa into a five year plan.4  The strategic plan 
set forth by former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and the Director of USAID, 
Andrew S. Natsios, will increase DoS and USAID’s assistance to African states 
and the African Union (AU).  This new strategy acknowledges the fact that the 
United States most significant security threats are failing states, international 
terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).5 
In order to meet these threats, the government is shifting towards a 
strategy of encouraging democracy as the means by which to reduce both the 
spread of state collapse and governmental corruption: 
Instability and conflict among states arise from diverse 
causes.  Ethnic hatred, unequaled economic opportunities, and 
political discrimination within states can lead to instability and 
refugee flows that spill across borders.  Societies that lack means 
of dissent can nurture radical ideologies that appeal to those who 
feel threatened by existing norms and arrangements.  Often, 
legitimate grievances provide opportunities for unscrupulous or 
shortsighted leaders who exploit and exacerbate tensions.  Stable 
relations among states also can be threatened by changes in their 
relative wealth, power, and ambitions. 
The democratic transformation sweeping much of the world 
is a factor that supports stability by removing potential causes of 
conflict.  In addition, for the first time in 100 years, there is the 
prospect for a durable peace among the great powers based on a 
strategic alignment against common threats.  Despite these positive 
developments, regional tensions and crisis harm U.S. national 
security in varying degrees.  They strain our alliances, threaten 
peace, create fertile ground for terrorism, damage national 
economies, and intensify human suffering. 
                                            
4 Strategic Plan Fiscal-Years 2004-2009-Security, Democracy, and Prosperity: Aligning 
Diplomacy with Development Assistance”. U.S. Department of State (DoS) and US Agency for 
International Development (USAID).Department of State and USAID Publication No: 11084. 
Secretary of State: Collin L. Powell and Administrator, USAID: Andrew S. Natsios. Released 
August 2003 www.state,gov and www.usaid.gov.,4-10 
5 Strategic Plan Fiscal-Years 2004-2009-Security, Democracy, and Prosperity: Aligning 
Diplomacy with Development Assistance”. U.S. Department of State (DoS) and US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), 3-4 
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Securing stable and peaceful relations among states is a 
fundamental, traditional goal of diplomacy.  Building the foundations 
for stability and addressing the root causes of conflict are vital roles 
of development assistance.  In each region of the world, we will 
build effective ties with allies, friends, partners, and regional and 
international organizations ultimately to resolve existing and 
emergent conflicts.  In each region, we will focus on key priorities to 
achieve this goal.6 
The Department of Defense has a distinct role to play to support these 
regional challenges and either defend or protect U.S. national interests against 
such regional security threats and global changes.  In Africa, correcting these 
regional challenges while encouraging democratic progress is a slow and 
deliberate proccess.  The current U.S. strategy in Africa is to identify and 
empower regional anchor states that are aligned with U.S. national interests, 
such as Morocco, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, and Ethiopia. 
This alignment continues to support specific African anchor states, but 
emphasizes a larger political role for the African Union (AU) and the regional and 
sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African 
States), SADC (South African Democratic Community), EAC (East African 
Community), IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority for Development), and UMA 
(Union du Maghreb Arab)).  A significant element to shaping democracy in Africa 
is our continued assistance and support for these African regional and sub-








                                            
6 Strategic Plan Fiscal-Years 2004-2009-Security, Democracy, and Prosperity: Aligning 
Diplomacy with Development Assistance”. U.S. Department of State (DoS) and US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), 6-10 
13 
African Union Sub-Regional Economic Organizations 
 
Figure 1. Africa’s Multiple Regional Economic Groups.  Africa Recovery: 
Volume 16, No. 2-3 September 2002 published by the U.N. Dept. of Public 





A number of years ago, the RAND Corporation conducted a case study of 
“The Effects of Defense and Security on Capital Formation in Africa: An Empirical 
Investigation”.  In this study, Daniel F. Kolher concludes that regional security 
fosters economic growth: 
The most obvious manifestation of military influence persists 
despite the fact that in terms of resources devoted to defense, most 
African countries, as well as the region as a whole, are 
considerably below average for the developed or developing 
world…  If the military has any positive effects on economic 
development, they must come from its traditional role as a security 
force.  Security influences development through its effect on 
investor confidence.  Private domestic investors, as well as foreign 
investors (or foreign bankers financing government investments), 
will be more willing to invest in countries that seem relatively 
secure, all other things held equal. 
Security is an elusive concept; it cannot be observed or 
measured in the way other variables can be measured.  Even 
worse, from the econometrician’s point of view, what matters in 
investment decisions is not so much a somehow objective 
assessment of the security situation as the investor’s perception of 
that situation.  We can hypothesize, though, that in general the 
strength of the defense forces should increase security, objectively 
as well as in the investors’ perception, and the presence of external 
and internal threats should reduce it...7  
By this indirect effect on investment, through security, the 
military can directly contribute to capital formation in two ways: By 
training individuals, and providing them with management and 
vocational skills, the armed forces contribute to the formation of 
human capital.  Through civic action, whereby military units 
undertake projects that result in capital useful to the civilian 
population (e.g., road construction); the military can contribute to 
the physical capital stock.8 
 
 
                                            
7 The RAND Corporation (RAND). A RAND NOTE: N-2653-USDP: The Effects of Defense 
and Security on Capital Formation in Africa: The Empirical Investigation. Prepared by the RAND 
Corporation for The Office of Thee Under Secretary for Defense for Policy (USDP). Santa 
Monica, California. September 1988, 2-3 
8 Ibid. The RAND Corporation (RAND). A RAND NOTE: N-2653-USDP: The Effects of 
Defense and Security on Capital Formation in Africa: The Empirical Investigation. 1988, 16 
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B. THE STABILITY CHALLENGES FOR AFRICA 
The United States will have to focus more on supporting African 
governments if it hopes to help build stronger democratic institutions throughout 
all of Africa.  First, we may need to concentrate on regional stability. Regional 
instability can be easily defined as the use of political violence between intrastate 
and interstate actors of Africa.  Instability includes the civil-military conflicts 
between warlords within corrupt or failing states, violent border disputes over 
disputed territories, interstate aggression over the control of limited natural 
resources, potential for internal civil wars, insurgencies, and continued 
oppressive military regimes all of which also can lead to large scale refugee flows 
that in turn affect the stability and security of neighboring countries.  
Unfortunately, U.S. interventions in Africa throughout the 1990s have not always 
been successful. 
Throughout the 1990’s, Sub-Saharan African intervention became the 
object of both international and US policy and military objectives during Peace-
Keeping Operations (PKO), Peace Enforcements Operations (PEO), 
Noncombatant Evacuations Operations (NEO), and numerous Humanitarian 
Assistance Operations (HA).  The United States has historically conducted these 
operations in Africa as an extension of both U.S. national policy and our 
increased regional interest within this continent.  Since the 1960s, Africa has 
known numerous civil wars, irregular wars, and insurgencies. 
16 
 
Figure 2. Illustration diagram during course instruction by Professor, Dr. John 
Arquilla, illustrating ”The Historical and Future Dilemmas of Unconventional 
Wars” at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California9 
 
During the last several decades many African states gained their 
independence. Yet, these countries continue to be affected by low-intensity 
conflict and irregular warfare.  If left ignored for another decade, such conflicts 
are bound to affect U.S. national security within these regions.  Societal 
challenges are likely to continue to increase throughout this region as the direct 
result of increased social and political pressures on many existing African 
governments and their weak governmental institutions.  This is described in detail 
by Herbert Howe in his book, Ambiguous Order: Military forces in Africa States. 
As Howe notes:  
                                            
9 Figure 8: Illustration diagram during course instruction by Professor, Dr. John Arquilla, for 
the illustration for ”The Historical and Future Dilemma of Unconventional Wars” at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 
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Most African conflicts since independence have been 
intrastate, generally featuring an ethnic or regional group opposing 
an existing regime.  Nevertheless, African wars are increasingly 
presenting strong interstate aspects: invasion, direct or indirect 
support for insurgents, and armed intervention on behalf of the 
threatened regime from outside the country.  African, rather than 
Western, states have become the major interveners… Rebels can 
tap into widespread public disillusionment or anger directed at a 
string of unaccountable, personal rulers… 
They can press gang child soldiers to swell their ranks, if 
necessary, and rarely suffer from international retribution.  Thus, 
they prove less controllable by outside forces that were those in 
previous insurgencies.  They can divide and subdivide into smaller 
splinter groups, lessening the chances for successful 
comprehensive negotiations; the attraction of personal gain may 
lesson their desire for political negotiations.10 
 
1. The Threat of Regional Terrorist Environments 
Major characteristics of modern insurgents and terrorist are described by 
Donald Snow as:  
 
The apparent absence of clear military objectives that can be 
translated into coherent strategies and tactics.  The insurgents do 
not engage in fixed-position combat (and wear no uniforms), and 
can shift alliances quickly, given their lack of ideology.   
Factions often target any valuable resource or population 
without needing to obey established codes of conduct and may use 
drugs to induce extreme behavior and they are increasingly 
engaged in urban warfare.  
This last point frustrated the United States and the United 
Nations (UN) in Somalia and ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and, given 
Africa’s rapid urbanization will increasingly bedevil state or foreign 
intervention forces.  Recent urban battlefields include Mogadishu 
(Somalia), Brazzaville (Congo-Brazzaville), Bangui (Central African 
Republic), Huambo (Angola), Kigali (Rwanda), Freetown (Sierra 
Leone), Bujumburua (Burundi), and Monrovia (Liberia).11 
 
The United States has recently identified the need to shift some of its 
focus and influence toward Northern African, the Horn of Africa (HOA), and 
                                            
10 Robert M. Howe. Ambiguous Order – Military Forces in African States, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 2001, 75 
11 Robert M. Howe. Ambiguous Order – Military Forces in African States, 2001, 75 
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throughout Africa’s Pan-Sahel region.  In 2003, Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld called for a systematic change in the military strategic engagement 
strategy towards Africa for the near future.  This change to a better regional-
focused strategy has caused the Department of Defense (DoD) to redefine its 
objectives and initiatives from an older conventional engagement strategy of 
multiple Theater Engagement Plans (TEP) to more regionally focused Regional 




Figure 3. The U.S. National Security Strategy For Combating Terrorism 
illustrating “The Structures Of Terror” (NSS), 200313 
 
The current U.S. Counter Terrorism (CT) Strategy is politically organized 
and militarily structured toward combating the structures of terror and identifying 
                                            
12 “National Strategy For Combating Terrorism, February 2003: This National Strategy 
reflects the reality that success will only come through the sustained, steadfast, and systematic 
application of all the elements of national power-diplomatic, economic, information, financial, law 
enforcement, intelligence, and military-simultaneously across four fronts. We will defeat terrorist 
organizations of global reach through relentless action. We will deny terrorists the sponsorship, 
support, and sanctuary they need to survive.  We will win the war of ideas and diminish the 
underlying conditions that promote the despair and the destructive visions of political change that 
lead people to embrace, rather than shun, terrorism. And throughout, we will use all the means at 
our disposal to defend against terrorist attacks on the United States, our citizens, and our 
interests around the world.” 2003, 23, 29 
13 Figure 9: The National Security Strategy For Combating Terrorism, illustration of “The 










National Security Strategy For Combating Terrorism 
“The Structures of Terror” 
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environmental conditions within each geographical region, to include the 
underlying conditions, the international environment, the state, and terrorist 
organizations.  Concurrently, the strategy is directed toward targeting the senior 
terrorist leadership within these global networks and regional terror 
organizations. 14 
The current U.S. policy in Africa is still largely focused on a post-9/11 
Counter Terrorism Strategy as illustrated in the diagram “Structures of Terror”.15  
These definitions of the structures can be helpful in our continued efforts to 
identify U.S. foreign external influences within the region.  They can further focus 
our efforts on a long term process centered around achieving future regional 
stability and security where U.S. national interests are threatened.  However, the 
major problem with attempting to reach these objectives in Africa is that efforts 
are usually not mutually enforced or properly coordinated among the Department 
of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), or other important U.S. 
Governmental Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  The 
critical elements for supporting African governmental institutions that can help 
increase their national capacities to govern their people, provide better security, 
and support them in controlling their border territories with existing national 
sovereignty has seldom been coordinated across the U.S. government. 
The United States politicians and senior military leadership must 
recognize that in order to shape African countries for the future, our current 
efforts at developing a long-term strategy in Africa must be politically organized 
with a central authority, with proper coordination and integration undertaken 
between all U.S. efforts within this region. 
Throughout Africa, foreign external resources are especially critical for 
African “state” survival as the result of economic globalization and the states’ 
limited access to international financial resources.  African states require such 
resources in order to politically and institutionally survive the rising internal 
challenges that affect their political legitimacy and ability to govern their 
                                            
14 National Strategy For Combating Terrorism, 2003, 6 
15 Ibid. Figure of ‘Structures of Terror’ is extracted from the National Strategy For Combating 
Terrorism, 2003, 6 
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territories.  The recent trend in Africa is to recognize that external foreign 
influences are able to influence internal politics and influence political interactions 
and successful cooperation between the state and internal rational actors, 
especially in terms of their capacity to extract available resources.  Foreign 
influence by external governments, corporate firms, NGOs, mercenaries, and 
other political organizations can also influence weak state rulers, economic 
strongmen, and even help regional warlords through the preexisting African 
patrimonial networks that existed prior to the end of the Cold War and 
commercial globalization.16 
 
2. Stopping Radical and Extremist Violence 
 The National Defense Strategy provides theoretical, strategic, operational, 
and tactical capabilities for defeating radical and extreme violence and terrorism 
by concentrating on multilateral and regional coalitions, interagency coordination 
and integration, capable and actionable intelligence, maximizing Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) regional expertise and unilateral engagement 
capabilities, and identifying and creating long-term strategic effects for 
accomplishing U.S. national interests.  In Africa, the counterterrorism initiatives 
need to be regionally focused in order to successfully integrate the realistic 
constraints and limitations inherent to the region and to each country. 
One of the key strategic capabilities for the US is its ability to advise, 
equip, train and support foreign militaries and security organizations around the 
world as described in the National Defense Strategy, a primary document for this 
GWOT:  
 Security cooperation is important for expanding international 
capacity to meet common security challenges.  One of our 
militaries’ most effective tools in prosecuting the Global War On 
Terrorism (GWOT) is to help train indigenous forces.  
 The U.S. Government created the Office of the Coordinator 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department to 
bolster the capabilities of U.S. civilian agencies and improve 
                                            
16 National Strategy For Combating Terrorism, 2003, 222-223 
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coordination with international partners to contribute to the 
resolution of complex crisis overseas.  The Department is 
cooperating with this new office to increase the capacity of 
interagency and international partners to perform non-military 
stabilization and reconstruction tasks that might otherwise often 
become military responsibilities by default.  Our intent is to focus 
our efforts on those tasks most directly associated with establishing 
favorable long-term security conditions.17 
The U.S. policy approaches defeating terrorism, insurgency, and political 
insurrection by meeting the following strategic security requirements: 
 
1. Identify, disrupt, and destroy terrorism groups and supporting networks 
 
2. Expand Counterterrorism (CT) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
capabilities to regional organizations and states 
 
3. Diminish African States’ Underlying Conditions (UC) that are linked to 
supporting Terrorism 
 
4. Win the War of Ideology by spreading Democratic Development 
Initiatives 
 
5. Increase Regional Intelligence capabilities and resources 
 
6. Establish and support the creation of an US assisted African Union 
(AU) Combined Regional Security-Stand By Force (CRS-SBF) 
 
7. Develop Country and Regional African governmental institutions and 
‘capacity-building’ institutions and infrastructures 
  
 Strategically, the regional focus will have to involve a continued political-
military effort to successfully engage and sustain the Global War On Terrorism 
(GWOT).  In order to effectively counter terrorism and deter ethnic violence and 
radical extremism, a monumental effort towards increasing and integrating 
intelligence collection and analysis by, with, and though international, multilateral, 
and interagency coordinated efforts and actions is paramount. The GWOT 
demands increased state cooperation in order to combat international, 
                                            
17 The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. The Department of 
Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. March 01, 2005, 12-16 
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transnational, and regional security threats.  At the same time, an opportunity 
exists for establishing and executing regional security cooperation agreements 
between the United States, international partners, and African states in addition 
creating new governmental security institutions. 
  
3. Size and Shape of Geography Effects Regional Security and 
Stability 
Africa is the world’s second largest continent and occupies about 20% of 
the Earth's land area.18  The sheer size and geographical composition of Africa 
along with its diverse cultures and ethnic tensions will only continue to 
overwhelm international and U.S. economic investment effects unless regional 
security can be achieved.  Consider the following political, economic, cultural, 
and social features: 
1. Africa measures about 5,000 miles (8,000 km) from north to south and 
about 4,600 miles from east to west.  Africa's land area is roughly 
11.724 ml. sq. ml. (30.3657 ml. sq. km).  The coastline of Africa is 
18,950 miles.  The prime meridian (0º longitude) crosses Africa from 
north to south, passing through the Terma near Accra in Ghana.19 
 
2. The African continent is almost equally geographically separated by 
the Earth’s equator.  Most of Africa lies within the tropical region, 
bounded on the north by the Tropic of Cancer and on the south by the 
Tropic of Capricorn.  The largest lake in Africa is Lake Victoria, the 
chief reservoir of the Nile River.  Other great lakes in Africa are 
Tanganyika Lake (in Tanzania and Congo) and Lake Nyasa in 
(Tanzania and Malawi).20 
3. The Nile River is the world’s longest river, spanning 4,160 miles from 
the Mediterranean Sea in North East Africa to Lake Victoria in South 
East Africa.  Other long rivers in Africa are the Congo, Niger, Zambezi, 
and Orange Rivers.21 
4. Africa has an average elevation of about 2,200 feet (670 m).  The East 
African Rift System constitutes Africa’s most extensive mountain 
system.  The highest mountain in Africa is Mt Kilimanjaro (19,317 ft) in 
Tanzania.  The Atlas Mountains along the northwestern coast rise to 
                                            
18 Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts. Retrieved on 08/21/2005 from the Internet from 
http://www.globeafrica.com/Commons/geo.htm, 2003, 1 
19 Ibid. Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts, 2003, 1 
20 Ibid. Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts, 2003, 1 
21 Ibid. Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts, 2003, 1 
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more than 13,000 feet (4,000 m).  The Sahara is the world's largest 
contiguous desert with 3.5 million square miles of land area.  Other 
major deserts in Africa are the Namib and the red-sanded Kalahari in 
southern Africa.22 
5. Only about 6% of Africa is arable; nearly 25% is forested or wooded.  
The largest country in Africa is Sudan spanning 968,000 sq mi.  
Africa’s population is slightly less than 14% of the total world 
population.23 
6. Africa's share of the world's major strategic mineral reserves is 
estimated as follows: 12% petroleum, 27% bauxite, 29% uranium, 20% 
copper, 67% phosphates, and substantial reserves of iron ore, tin, 
manganese, chromium, cobalt, platinum, and titanium.  Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Sudan, and Nigeria are the major petroleum and natural gas 
producing countries in Africa.  Botswana, Congo (D. R.), and South 
Africa together produce 50% of the world's diamonds.  Ghana, South 
Africa, and Zimbabwe together produce nearly 50% of the world’s 
gold.24 
7. Africa's major languages include Arabic (North), Berber (Morocco and 
Algeria), Bantu group of languages (Central and Southern Africa), 
Swahili (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda), Akan (Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire), 
Saharan and Maba (Chad basin), Koma (the Blue Nile basin), and 
Songhai (upper-middle Niger River region).25 
8. The most prevalent diseases in Africa include malaria, dysentery, 
tuberculosis, whooping cough, typhoid fever, gonorrhea, and 
HIV/AIDS.26 
 
C. CORRECTING U.S. DEPARTMENTAL AND REGIONAL FLAWS 
Once we consider this diversity it should quickly become apparent that the 
typical U.S. government approach needs to be re-thought, in part because the 
U.S. government does not have a ‘typical’, let alone coherent approach across 
agencies.  For instance, the Department of State (DoS) and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) define the region of Africa 
differently than does the Department of Defense (DoD).  The DoS and USAID 
                                            
22 Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts. Retrieved on August 21, 2005 from the Internet from 
http://www.globeafrica.com/Commons/geo.htm.  2003, 1 
23 Ibid. Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts.  2003, 1 
24 Ibid. Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts. 2003, 1 
25 Ibid. Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts. 2003,  1 
26 Ibid. Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts. 2003, 1 
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combine their geographical regional area operations as 1) Asia and the Near 
East, and 2) Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The African countries that characterize the DoS-Bureau of Near East 
Affairs are located along the northern Arab region called the Maghreb.  The 
Maghreb geographically defines the Arabian regions of Northern Africa by 
including the countries of Morocco, Western Sahara, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and 
Egypt:27  In contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa is comprised of Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, 



















                                            
27 Department of State (DoS). The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.  Regional responsibility 
and list of countries along the Maghreb and Middle East.  Map illustration was retrieved August 
17, 2005 from the Internet at http://www.state.gov/p/nea 
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The geographical responsibility for how the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 
(NEA), Department of State (DoS) defines North Africa as the “Maghreb” as 
an extension of the Middle East 
 
Figure 4. Department of State (DoS): The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.  
Regional responsibility and list of countries along the Maghreb and Middle East.  




The geographical responsibility for how the Bureau of African Affairs (AA), 
Department of State (DoS) defines Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Figure 5. Department of State (DoS): The Bureau of African Affairs.  
Regional responsibility and list of countries within Sub-Saharan Africa. Map 
illustration was retrieved August 17, 2005 from the Internet at 
http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/ 
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Historically, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of 
State (DoS) have competed against one another for resources and have often 
had different political objectives.  That is one explanation for why each agency 
treats the map of Africa so differently.  The current DoD organizational structure 
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) at policy level also recognize a North 
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, but with somewhat different dimensions. 
Currently, DoD divides regional responsibility for Africa among three 
separate geographical combatant commands (GCC’s): USEUCOM (United 
States European Command), USCENTCOM (United States Central Command), 
and USPACOM (United States Pacific Command).  Within each of these specific 
geographical unified commands, USEUCOM controls North Africa and Sub-
Saharan Africa, and USCENTCOM has responsibility for the Horn of Africa, while 
USPACOM controls the five African islands within the Indian Ocean region, to 
include Madagascar. 
One sees the potential for confusion when one considers that, although 
the Horn of Africa (HOA) is strategically important within the Middle East region, 
the sea lines of communication (LOC’s) within the Red Sea continue to be 
controlled regionally by USCENTCOM.  Yet, the African island countries of the 
Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros, and Madagascar, located in the Indian Ocean, 
meanwhile regionally fall under USPACOM’s purview. 
If the regional responsibility for Africa is separated internally between 
three DoD unified geographical combatant commands how, we might wonder, 
does this possibly mesh with DoS’s configuration?  How can DoD and the DoS 
possibly support one another with foreign diplomacy meant to effectively focus on 
supporting U.S. national interests within Africa?  
At the very least, we also need to bear in mind Africa’s own regional and 
sub-regional divisions. For example: the African Union (AU) member states are 
recognized and regionally organized into five geo-political-economic sub-regions 
within Africa: 
27 
North Africa- Five (5) AU Member States: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Mauritania, Tunisia, and Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic  
(NOTE: Morocco is the only African country that is not a member of the 
African Union (AU). 
West Africa- Sixteen (16) AU Member States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
Central Africa- Nine (9) AU Member Sates: Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe. 
East Africa- Thirteen (13) AU Member Sates: Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, 
Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
South Africa- Ten (10) AU Member Sates: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 













Africa: The current USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM Unified 
Geographic Combatant Commanders' Area of Responsibility (AOR) 
 
Figure 6. The I983 Combatant Commander’s regional Area of 
Responsibilities (AOR) for Africa, 2000(Parameters, No. 30, US Army War 
College Quarterly (Winter 2000-2001). “A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? 
Rethinking the Unified Command Plan.” by Richard G. Catoire. (Pages 102-117). 
Retrieved Feb. 04, 2005 from http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00winter/catoire.htm28 
 
If the U.S. intends to work through regional organizations like the AU, 




                                            
28 Figure 3: The I983 Combatant Commander’s regional Area of Responsibilities (AOR) for 
Africa, 2000(Parameters, No. 30, US Army War College Quarterly (Winter 2000-2001). “A CINC 
for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan.” by Richard G. Catoire. 2000-01, 
102-117. Retrieved Feb. 04, 2005 from http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00winter/catoire.htm 
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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. AFRICA AND THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE UNITED STATES 
UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN (UCP) 
The United States has been operating under the Unified Command Plan 
of 1946 with few organizational changes since World War II.  During the years 
between 1949 and 1952, the United States’ unified commands throughout the 
world were strategically affected by Cold War threats and more traditionally by 
European NATO alignments.  The strategy during both the post-World War II and 
the post-Cold War eras has been to be able to fight in two major theaters of war 
concurrently.  The UCP’s World War II legacy still affects DoD today.  We see 
this in how USEUCOM and USPACOM are currently aligned and historically 
have been organized and structured to fight.  In many ways, they remain the geo-
strategic model for the DoD, especially since the two largest unified geographical 
combatant commands still strategically control most U.S. forces in the world. 
 
 
Figure 7. The Commander’s Area of Responsibility. The 2003-2004 
USSOCOM SOF Posture Statement.  Retrieved on September 5th, 2005, from 






The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
1949, with Europe as its center of gravity, influenced allied strategic partnerships 
and cooperation developments throughout Europe, and only since the end of the 
Cold War has U.S. national security strategy been focused on other geographical 
regions.  This shift in focus, as the world develops and global cooperation 
strengthens, has led to revisions in the Unified Command Plan (UCP).  However, 
the UCP is currently an inadequate reflection of U.S. national initiatives and 
security cooperation within Africa. 
In 1956, the first annual review of the Unified Command Plan of 1946 was 
conducted.  This revision included a document from the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) that proposed creation of a Middle East Command (MECOM).  The 
increasingly hostile political developments occurring in the Middle East during the 
1960s not only presented new strategic challenges to the United States, but 
signaled to the JCS that a change in the unified command structure was indeed 
needed.  The 1958 Department of Defense Reorganization Act can be described 
as the early equivalent to command reorganization and transformation of regional 
authority that took place under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.  Yet, to this day 
Africa remains woefully neglected. 
 
B. THE CREATION OF USEUCOM AND NORTH AFRICA 
During the years between 1949 and 1952, the United States military 
unified commands in the world were greatly affected by rising Cold War threats 
and the formalization of NATO’s political alignment.  The creation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 influenced strategic developments 
within Europe against the increasing security threats from the Soviet Union.29  By 
1954, the European Command (EUCOM) was established and the geographical 
responsibilities of this command would include all post-WWII countries within 
western Europe, countries along the Mediterranean Sea, and all the Algerian 
                                            
29 Cole, et al, 17 
31 
Departments of France.  EUCOM’s responsibilities within North Africa were only 
limited to French Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya.30 
 
1. U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM) and the Creation of 
MEAFSAIO (Middle East, Africa South of the Sahara, and 
South Asia, and the Indian Ocean) 
In 1963, the United States Strike Command (USSTRICOM) assumed 
regional responsibility for the Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, South 
Asia, and the Indian Ocean, all of which comprised a region called MEAFSAIO.31 
During this time, the unified and sub-unified commands between the military 
services located in the United States and the unified and sub-unified regional 
commands located throughout the world began to compete against one another 
in their efforts to govern resources and influence. 
During the 1960’s, the effects of continued military combat operations 
during the Vietnam War had enormous impacts on the military service 
commands, and regional unified commands began to resist the DoD’s 
commitment to transform and centralize its power under then-Secretary of 
Defense Robert S. McNamara.  During this decade, a long inter-service rivalry 
occurred between specific military services over regional responsibility and 
military control of the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa.  USSTRICOM was 
regionally responsible for planning and executing all military operations within the 
geographical region of MEAFSA, but in 1964 it was EUCOM that coordinated the 
hostage rescue mission in the Congo and operationally assisted Belgian 
                                            
30 “USCINCEUR assumed command in Europe effective 1 August 1952.  In a message 
approved by the Secretary of Defense, the JCS on 2 December 1952 spelled out for the 
USCINCEUR his geographical area of responsibility: Norway, Denmark, West Germany, Berlin, 
Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Austria, Trieste, the 
Mediterranean Sea, The Mediterranean Islands, Algerian Departments of France, the United 
Kingdom, including the territorial water of those countries…  His North African responsibilities 
were limited to joint planning in French Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya and to military aspects of 
negotiations for base rights.” Cole, et al, 18-19 
31 Cole, et al; 69 
32 
Paratroopers with U.S. aviation transportation assets.32  Also in 1967, EUCOM 
conducted multiple Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) from numerous 
Middle Eastern countries during the Arab-Israeli War.33 
So, despite these structural and command organizational complications 
within the unified command organizations, EUCOM was nevertheless able to 
regionally effect military operations in both the Middle East and Africa with U.S. 
military forces and logistical support from U.S. Military Operational Bases (MOB) 
located throughout Europe.  These two operations were the main cause for the 
disestablishment of STRICOM / MEAFSA, which occurred in 1971.  The result 
was a new unified command organization, the Readiness Command 
(USREDCOM), which became regionally responsible for the MEAFSA and was 















                                            
32 “In November 1962, Secretary of Defense assigned CINCLANT the responsibility for plans 
and operations pertaining to Sub-Saharan Africa; he instructed CINCLANT to establish a small 
Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF-4) under an Army lieutenant general.  A controversy arose 
over whether CINCLANT was now excluded from “routine” Sub-Saharan operations.  In July 196, 
Secretary McNamara apportioned Sub-Saharan responsibilities as follows: Military Assistance 
Program (MAP) to USCINCEUR and the Secretary of the Army, The Congo air evacuation to 
USCINCEUR, and the Congo sea evacuation to CINLANT.” Cole, et al, 30-31 
33 Cole, et al, 34 
33 
MEAFSA 
Middle East, North Africa, and Africa south of the Sahara 
(The complexity of the geographical area) 
 
Figure 8. Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI). African Data 
Dissemination Service (ADDS). NASA NDVI Image Produced By: USGS-EROS 





2. U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) and MEAFSA 
In 1971, crises in the Middle East heightened increased interest in security 
initiatives for the Middle East.  In June of 1971, President Nixon approved a new 
plan to change the command responsibility of the 1963 Unified Command Plan 
(UCP).  The new recommendations from the Secretary of Defense and JCS 
forwarded to the President suggested the extension of USEUCOM to include the 
Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Iran.  The JCS also 
recommended that the PACOM area should meet the EUCOM geographical area 
east of Iran and south of east Africa and connect with LANTCOM’s area of 
                                            
34 Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI). African Data Dissemination Service 
(ADDS). NASA NDVI Image Produced By: USGS-EROS Data Center. Retrieved Feb. 04, 2005 
from http://igskmncnwb015.cr.usgs.gov/adds/imgbrowses2.php?adds=&image=nd&extent=af 
34 
responsibility around the entire African continent.35  The UCP of 1972 authorized 
the disestablishment of the unified command of USSTRICOM / 
USCINCMEAFSA.36  Consequently, Africa south of the Sahara became 
strategically unassigned and no regional combatant command assumed 
geographic responsibility for the sub-Saharan areas of Africa. 
In 1975, the approved UCP was distributed.  The final recommendations 
concluded that the geographical boundaries of USPACOM would include the 
entire Indian Ocean to the east coast of Africa, as well as the African islands of 
Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros, and the Maldives.37  The President also 
authorized that North Africa and the Middle East were to remain within the 
USEUCOM area of responsibility.  Finally, in May 1976, the Unified Command 
Plan (UCP) became effective and the area known as “Africa South of the Sahara” 
continued to remain geographically unassigned to any unified or sub-unified 
command.38 
 
3. U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) and the Rapid 
Deployment Joint Task Force 
In 1976 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger created REDCOM 
(Readiness Command), with responsibilities that focused on executing global 
contingency planning and providing a Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters staff 
for future operations.  But REDCOM was not regionally assigned any area of 
responsibility nor given any additional military forces. 
In 1977, the JCS initiated an investigation into creating a Rapid 
Deployment Force (RDF) that would assume regional contingency planning 
within the U.S. Readiness Command in the Middle-Eastern region and merge the 
                                            
35 Cole, et al, 40 
36 “The USCINCMEAFSA area would be divided as follows: southern Asia to PACOM, the 
Middle East to USEUCOM, and Africa south of the Sahara to LANTCOM.” Cole, et al, 40 
37 Cole, et al, 48 
38 “The Joint Chiefs of Staff also informed the Secretary that, as of 1 March 1980, the RDJTF 
headquarters had become fully operational.  While the RDJTF headquarters would be under the 
operational command of USCINCRED for planning, training and deploying, the new headquarters 
would be a separate subordinate element of USREDCOM.  Once deployed to the Persian Gulf 
region, the RDJTF headquarters and forces would come under the operational control of either 
USCINCEUR or CINCPAC.” Cole, et al, 69 
35 
command structures into a Joint Rapid Deployment Task Force (JRDTF) that 
would assume regional responsibility as a separate unified command within 
USREDCOM.39 
 
C. THE CREATION OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM) 
On January 1, 1983, President Ronald Reagan and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) authorized the creation of a new unified command, the United States 
Central Command.   The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) 
initially was created because rising U.S. national security interests focused 
around the growing Middle East Crisis in 1973 and the Israeli-Egypt War of 
1974.40   
The Unified Command Plan (UCP) of 1983 historically recognized the 
long-standing relationship between NATO, Europe, and the European countries, 
former colonies in Africa. The seven African countries within East Africa located 
along the Red Sea were included within the geographical responsibility of U.S. 






                                             
39 “Expanding upon the recommendations of 18 May 1981, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed 
to the Secretary of Defense on July 6 1981 terms of reference and additional forces for the 
RDJTF…The proposed RDJTF area of operations included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, 
Democratic Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya, and the red Sea and the Persian Gulf.  Once 
the RDJTF developed its capacity to perform all normal operations as a unified command, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to expand the area of operations to include some or all of the 
following: Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, India, and the Indian Ocean.” Cole, et al, 75 
40 “The Joint Chief of Staff had not agreed in 1979 on the creation of a Rapid Deployment 
Joint Task Force, and command arrangements for the Middle East remained a controversial issue 
during 1980.  Not until April 1981 did the Secretary of Defense instruct the JCS to submit a five 
years or less into a “separate unified command” for the countries bordering the Red Sea, the 
Persian Gulf, and the western part of the Indian Ocean…In a memorandum on 23 September 
1981, they added Egypt and Sudan to the “ultimate” geographic area of RDJTF.  The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff also agreed to designate the RDJTF as a separate joint task force, effective 1 October 
1981.” Cole, et al, 74-76 
36 
island countries located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, including Madagascar, 
became geographically aligned within U.S. Pacific Command’s (USPACOM) area 
of responsibility.41 
The U.S. geographical boundaries for USCENTCOM (the Middle East and 
the Horn of Africa) and USEUCOM (North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa) 
persists.42  The current Unified Command Plan (UCP) continues to treat Africa as 
a misbegotten stepchild.  Nor can the current boundaries possibly promote a 














                                            
41 “In response to a JCS call for a biennial review, both CINCLANT and CINCPAC 
expressed dissatisfaction with the assigned area of the RDJTF.  CINCLANT recommended 
broadening the RDJTF area of Africa to include all the remaining states not already assigned to it 
or to USEUCOM, that all of Africa south of the Sahara and west of the Sudan and Kenya.  
CINCPAC asserted that responsibility for naval operations in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, 
and the Red Sea should not be artificially divided between himself and COMRDJTF but should be 
assigned entirely to himself as the commander with the experience and naval resources to do the 
job.” Cole, et al, 77 
42 “Effective 1 January 1983, USCINCCENT would plan and conduct all normal operations, 
with one exception, for the northeast African countries of Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
and Somalia; the Arabian peninsular countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates, the Yemen Arab Republic, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, and 
Bahrain; the Middle East mainland countries of Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Jordan; and 
the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.  The exception, security assistance to Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, would continue as a CINCPAC responsibility until transferal to USCENTCOM on 1 
October 1983.  Also under the revised UCP of 1983, USCINCEUR would remain responsible for 
the North African states of Morocco. Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.  All other African states south of 
the Sahara and west of Sudan and Kenya would continue to be unassigned.” Cole, et al, 78 
37 
The 1983 Unified Command Plan (UCP) 
 
Figure 9. Current Commander’s area of responsibility for Africa, 2000. 
Parameters, No. 30, US Army War College Quarterly (Winter 2000-2001). “A 
CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan.” by 
Richard G. Catoire. (Pages 102-117). Retrieved Feb. 04, 2005 from 
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00winter/catoire.htm43 
 
D. UNITED STATES REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR AFRICA 
Unfortunately, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. political and military 
leaders have chosen to ignore issues related to Africa in favor of other 
geographical regions such as Eastern Europe, Southwestern Asia and, most 
recently, the Middle East with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation  
 
                                            
43 Figure 5: Richard G. Catoire. Current Commander’s area of responsibility for Africa, 2000. 
Parameters, No. 30, US Army War College Quarterly (Winter 2000-2001). “A CINC for Sub-
Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan.” Pages 102-117. Retrieved February 04, 







Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  Africa is a continent that is considered to be of little national 
strategic importance and is most commonly referred to as a “Limited 
Engagement Theater”. 
One obvious solution is to create a stand alone unified or sub-unified 
Regional Combatant Command (RCC) that is focused on both the Africa of today 
and on future U.S. national security issues within this region.  The significance of 
Africa is similar to that the Middle East during the mid-to-late 20th Century.  A 
regional joint headquarters that eventually became the U.S. Central Command 
(USCENTCOM), able to provide the JCS with strategic regional capacity 
developed from a forward positioned Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 
(RDJFT), initially established on March 1, 1980.44 
After all, the Department of the Defense Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) establishes four key strategic principles that focus on regional cooperative 
security relationships: (1) enhance regional capacities of foreign partners; (2) 
expand cohesion within U.S. inter-agencies that define building strategic security 
partnerships to defeat terrorism; (3) defend the homeland in-depth; (4) shape 
‘pivotal’ countries to balance future strategic crossroads; and (5) prevent the 
acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction by a hostile state or non-state 
actors.45 
This would seem to suggest for all the reasons explained in Chapter 1 that 
Africa be treated differently than it has been up to now.  Yet, how much change 
                                            
44 “United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) replaced the Rapid Deployment Joint 
Task Force (RDJTF) was established in March 1, 1980.  Beginning in 1977, the JCS again 
undertook to merge command arrangements for MEAFSA with efforts to create a rapid 
deployment force (RDF) for use in the area.  After the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973, oil-
producing states in the Persian Gulf region raised oil prices to punish the Western countries and 
Japan for Israeli occupation of former Arab lands.  Concerned that the Arab states might choke 
off the flow of oil to the West or that the Soviet Union might invade neighboring Islamic states, 
President Carter on 24 August 1977 directed that a study be made of creating a rapid deployment 
force of two or more light divisions for use in the Persian Gulf region.” Cole, et al, 66-67 
45 “The discovery of large oil reserves in the Gulf of Guinea there is tremendous economic 
potential for the region that has heretofore been absent.  The energy potential is, in a sense, a 
double-edged sword: while it provides economic development value for the region, it is also a 
lightening rod for conflict that simmers below the surface of an ethically and culturally diverse 
region. Our presence and security cooperative measures can help mitigate instability, assist 
fragile democracies to confront threats, and provide the basis for real progress and economic 
prosperity in the region.” General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander, USEUCOM; official 
statement before The House Armed Service Committee on March 09, 2004, 16 
39 
has there been?  For instance, in an official statement released on March 9, 2005 
General James L. Jones Commander USEUCOM, addressed the House Armed 
Service Committee regarding USEUCOM’s future strategic assessment of the 
region.46  In the beginning of his statement Africa is mentioned as a critical area 
where future political, economic, military, and social realities deserve attention, 
but ironically, as the statement continues, EUCOM remains far more interested in 
its other strategic partners.47 
Even though domestic problems exist throughout Africa, states there are 
demonstrating collaborative efforts toward finding regional solutions to stability 
and security problems.  With regional security arrangements and sub-regional 
approaches, countries are developing the capacity to build and rely on sub-
regional organizations, and are now better arranged for integration and 
cooperation with a regionally oriented U.S. unified or sub-unified military 
command that can help them establish a more robust framework for long-term 
stability and security in the area.48   
This decade will present an opportunity for the U.S. to establish and 
secure a regional long-term military strategy that shapes African regional security 
for the future: 
                                            
46 Statement made by General James L. Jones, Commander U.S. European Command 
(USEUCOM) in his official statement to The House Armed Service Committee on March 9, 2005: 
“Our 21st Century center of gravity reflects the continuing importance of the greater Middle east, 
the Caucasus, the Levant, and the “ungoverned” regions of North and West Africa.’  The need to 
transform is a result of the successful integration of former Warsaw Pact nations into an overall 
European security framework, recognizes our growing strategic interests, and addresses the new 
operational requirements of the Global War On Terrorism…EUCOM’s Strategic Theater 
Transformation Plan is a component of the department of Defense Global Posture Strategy 
announced in August 2004.” General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander, USEUCOM; official 
statement before The House Armed Service Committee on March 09, 2004, 3-6 
47 “The U.S. faces strategic options and competition in Africa.  ‘According to the 2004 report 
on UN Organization for Industrial Development, Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of the 
world where, for the last 20 years, extreme poverty hasn’t stopped gaining ground.’ Continued 
poverty is but one of the many effects of years of tragic violence and instability in certain regions 
of Africa…Further, transnational extremists have demonstrate an interests in exploiting areas 
where nations are already struggling with resource scarcity, weak national institutions, poverty 
and inexperienced militaries.  These regions are defined by endemic imbalances in the 
distribution of wealth, staggering health problems, fragile political systems, regressive social 
systems, and disenfranchised youth susceptible to the lure of extremism.” General James L. 
Jones, USMC, Commander, USEUCOM; official statement before The House Armed Service 
Committee on March 09, 2004, 6-8 
48 Catoire, Richard G., “US Strategy for Africa: A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa?”. 
Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, Volume. XXX, No. Winter 2000-01,  5 
40 
This failure to engage Africa closely has led to a policy that 
more often than not is reactive rather than proactive.  It limits the 
ability to engage African decision makers on security issues, 
undermines the ability to obtain warnings of impending political 
crisis, and retards the ability to shape the regional security 
environment.  A unified command with exclusive responsibility for 
this region would assist in developing needed access and in 
bringing significantly greater focus to US regional security policy. 
If the United States is to effectively pursue its own security 
strategy in Africa, respond to the needs of its African partners, and 
mitigate extreme human rights tragedies, the United States must be 
able to anticipate crisis earlier, respond more rapidly in their initial 
stages, and cooperate more efficiently with regional actors. But no 
matter how pressing the potential scenarios, the United States is 




























                                            
49 Catoire, Richard G., “US Strategy for Africa: A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa?”. 
Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, Volume. XXX, No. Winter 2000-01,  5 
41 
The proposed establishment of a Unified or Sub-Unified Regional 
Combatant Command for Africa 
 
Figure 10. A proposed Africa Command area of responsibility, 1997.  
Parameters, No. 27, US Army War College Quarterly (Winter 1997-1998). By 
Catoire, Richard G., “US Strategy for Africa: A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa?”.  









                                            
50 Figure 7: A proposed Africa Command area of responsibility, 1997.  Parameters, No. 27, 
US Army War College Quarterly (Winter 1997-1998). By Catoire, Richard G., “US Strategy for 
Africa: A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa?”.  Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, Volume. 
























IV. THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN AFRICAN STRATEGIC 
REALIGNMENT 
A. THE STRATEGIC REQUIREMENT TO CREATE A SUB-UNIFIED 
REGIONAL COMMAND AND HEAD-QUARTERS FOR AFRICA 
In a post-September 11, 2001 world, international events continue to 
remind us of the dangerous threats posed by future international terrorist attacks 
and the continuing spread of a radical ideology born from Al Qaeda (AQ) and 
Usama Bin Laden (UBL).  In response, the world is prepared to engage in 
preemptive strategy against global and regional terror networks.  Today, this 
preemptive strategic vision is required just as much in Africa as anywhere else.  
Africa has recently become a center of increased attention following the invasion 
of Afghanistan and Iraq.  The United States European Command (USEUCOM) 
has recently been focusing counter-terrorism on the Sahel, for instance, and the 
Horn of Africa (HOA) has received special attention from the U.S. Central 
Command (USCENTCOM) in terms of tactical operations against Al Qaeda 
linked terror cells known to be operating within the region. 
There are many reasons why a specialized geo-political military 
organization and command headquarters should be planned, organized, 
equipped, and implemented for the entire continent of Africa.  The common 
sense approach for our U.S. national strategy would be to recognize the sheer 
geographical size of Africa that has been identified in Chapter 1.  The enormous 
size, never mind diversity, of Africa outstrips that of any other geographical 
regional command in the world today.  Today, Africa is challenged with 
monumental humanitarian crises, economic instability, continued civil wars, 
regional famine, governmental corruption, AIDS, crime, terrorism, and continued 
human rights violations. 
Since September 11, 2001, President Bush has created the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA).  A Free Trade Act (FTA) between the U.S. and 
Morocco has been instrumental in strengthening at least one bilateral alliance as 
part of the Global War On Terror (GWOT).  Other selected African countries have 
44 
improved relations and poverty through the Free Trade Act (FTA) as well, and 
the continued African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has helped 
strengthen ties initially implemented by former President Clinton in 1996. 
This strategic rationale for continuing economic assistance for Africa is 
based on supporting the regional fight against terrorism and Al Qaeda’s radical 
ideology throughout Africa.  But perceived economic changes are not likely to 
improve security and stability rapidly enough.  This is where military-to-military 
relations also become important.  Our national security strategy can be 
influenced by unconventional methods and state building in the form of military-
to-military programs that support regional and interstate Foreign Internal Defense 
(FID), either in the form of investment in coalition support structures or joint 
military security regional cooperation throughout Africa. 
Africa is often characterized as a complex region with many overlapping 
problems and constraints.  Since its early colonial development, both state 
independence and Cold War realities have contributed to ongoing African turmoil.  
The Department of Defense (DoD) National Defense Strategy of the United 
States of America lists our vulnerabilities: 
 
1. Our capacity to address global security challenges alone will be 
insufficient. 
 
2. Some Allies and partners will decide not to act with us or will 
lack the capacity to act with us. 
3. Our predominant position in the world affairs will continue to 
breed unease, a degree of resentment, and resistance. 
4. Our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by 
those who employ a strategy of the weak using international 
fora, judicial process, and terrorism.  
5. We and our allies we be the principal targets of extremism and 
terrorism.  
6. Natural forces of inertia and resistance to change will constrain 
military transformation.51 
                                            
51 The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. The Department of 
Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. March 2005, 5 
45 
Yet, through this lens, if one compares stated policy goals with actual 
policy initiatives on the ground the current treatment of Africa can be viewed as 
strategically flawed. 
 
THE AFRICAN UNION (AU) 
THE RECOGNIZED FIVE AFRICAN GEOGRAPHICAL  
SUB-REGIONS 
 
Figure 11. The African Union (AU) The Recognized Five African Geographical 




                                            
52 Figure 10: The African Union (AU).  The Five Sub-Regions of Africa.  Retrieved on August 
08, 2005 from the Internet at http;//www.africanaction.org/bp/regional.htm 
46 
B. NEW SYNERGIES 
Another way in which the military can help is to follow the suggestions 
made by the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG).  In its recommendation 
to the U.S. Congress and Senate on U.S. energy security interest AOPIG defines 
a critical role for Special Operations Forces (SOF).  AOPIG sees long-term 
opportunities to break away from current existing geo-strategic political pressures 
that exist between the three unified Regional Combatant Commands (RCCs) for 
USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM by having SOF focus efforts on the 
Gulf of Guinea sub-region.  What is intriguing about AOPIG’s recommendations 
is that these would create a new security environment and region of integrated 
security and economic prosperity, one that is already politically receptive to a 
U.S. political presence and valued military assistance.  As AOPIG puts it: 
As the Gulf of Guinea emerges as a new energy center of 
gravity and a vital U.S. interest, Washington needs to work with its 
regional allies to develop a practical set of foreign policy initiatives 
underpinning a long-term alignment.  These initiatives could provide 
for a U.S.-West Africa relationship defined by:  
1. A new and vigorous focus on U.S. military cooperation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, to include design of a sub-unified command 
structure which could produce significant dividends in the protection 
of U.S. investments, improving the level of military professionalism 
and subordination of African militaries to civil leadership, and in 
cooperatively confronting and eliminating global and regional 
terrorism; 
 
2. Large scale U.S. capital investment in regional infrastructure 
projects such as the Chad-Cameroon (Oil) and West Africa (Gas) 
pipeline projects leading to economic diversification in the agro-
business, hydrological and manufacturing sectors; 
 
 3. Expansion of the ideas articulated in the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to effect the creation of a 
U.S.-African free trade agreements, and  
 
4. A carefully measured and monitored U.S. commitment to 
debt forgiveness contingent upon bilateral partnerships promoting 
free market reforms in critical sectors as energy, banking, and 
47 
transportation, all the while recognizing that African States need to 
do their part to secure debt relief.53 
 
 Such an improved regional security framework might even help create and 
possibly accelerate democratic reforms in African civil governance and promote 
increased American capital investment throughout the region.  An increased and 
focused African Regional Combatant Command supported by a Regional African 
Special Operations Command could easily adapt and lead this sub-regional 
initiative by improving African political-military leadership, supporting regional 
trade and economic development, and assisting in the institutional capacity 
building needed in order to create better regional security.  The U.S. security 
requirements met by doing so could help deter and deny potential terrorists 
networks the capability to further infiltrate and find refuge in Africa. 
                                            
53 White Paper. African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development 
Prepared by the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG). This supporting thesis document was 





C. U.S. NATIONAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AFRICA AND 
THE FUTURE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (GWOT) 
The Current Commander’s Area of Responsibility 
 
Figure 12. The Commander’s Area of Responsibility. The 2003-2004 
USSOCOM SOF Posture Statement.  Retrieved on September 5, 2005, from 





1. Change USEUCOM’s, USCENTCOM’s, and USPACOM’s 
Geographical Area Of Responsibility (AOR) within Africa 
Another argument for a broadened, but also more region-specific 
approach to Africa has to do with preemption.  As Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have busily transformed the military 
into smaller units of action, organized and capable of both meeting regional 
challenges as future war fighters and peacekeepers, and rapidly deploying to any 
crisis around the world, a tremendous amount of effort has gone into man-




not only the terrorists ability to recruit, but also to hide.  If we are serious about 
regional security and stability, and if invest in these, then the population should 
prefer us to insurgents and terrorists.  
Indeed, in order for the DoD to become better prepared to support the 
Department of State’s (DoS) foreign policy more effectively and efficiently, the 
DoD should seriously start looking at regional capacity building as a core military 
mission.  Nothing else is likely to be more effective at combating regional threats 
from civil wars, insurgency, terrorism, ethnic and racial violence, ungoverned 
territories, and failing states. 
 
Recommendation 1:  Realign the Commander’s Area of Responsibility and 
create a unified geographical U.S. African Combatant Command 
(USAFCOM) 
 
Figure 13. This author’s changes after the Commander’s Area of 
Responsibility. The 2003-2004 USSOCOM SOF Posture Statement.  Retrieved 




Today, from a western perspective, Africa continues to be extremely 
complex.  Thus, my first recommendation is to transform and realign our 
50 
conceptions of Africa to meet the current geo-political realities of Africa.  This 
recommendation relies on the fact that in order to build African regional capacity, 
Africa will need to be supported by a unified U.S. African Command (USAFCOM) 
that is able to geo-politically assist, organize, command and control, provide a 
unity of effort to, and support US-African foreign policy and regional interests.  
Africa is similar, but is very different from USCENTCOM.  In Africa, the U.S. will 
be required to deepen and strengthen our cultural knowledge, language 
capabilities, economic awareness, and consolidate our regional expertise. 
The current geo-political relationship that USEUCOM has with Africa is 
ineffective and sometimes considered too European.  It is impossible for 
USEUCOM to continue to focus on African issues while Eastern Europe expands 
and NATO politically affects U.S.-African foreign policy.  It is entirely impossible 
for someone stationed in Western Europe to become an expert on Africa.  In 
order to become an African expert one must be stationed in Africa and become 
familiar with the cultural and ethnic differences, as well as the many different 
tribal languages that make up Africa.  Today, approximately 460 million people 
live in Africa, roughly 11% of the world’s population.  The world is estimated to 
have about 6,200 languages; within Africa there are an estimated 2,582 
languages and approximately 1,382 dialects. European and colonial foreign 
powers at the turn of the century drew the current national boundaries in Africa.  
The most important historical lesson learned from these demarcations was that 
the colonials paid little attention to the cultural, ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, 
or historical complexities within Africa.  Africans themselves are working hard to 
overcome these complexities through their sub-regional organizations.  This is in 
and of itself a reason for the U.S. to support such efforts by reconceptionalizing 
its view of Africa accordingly. 
In this regard, the final and most important aspect of a unified African 
Command (USAFCOM) is improved U.S. support for the regional and sub-
regional African Union economic and security communities.  In order to support 
African economic growth and security, a unified command will be required.  If, as 
predicted, the U.S. comes to increasingly rely on African sources of energy from 
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the Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa, then a U.S. African Command now and in 
the near term will become increasingly more vital to U.S.-African relations.  If 
Africa becomes a major source for U.S. foreign oil, following events similar to 
those that unfolded in the Middle East, then in this 21st Century the U.S. will be 
required to invest heavily in this region and continent in order to protect those 
vital resources from foreign competitors by establishing a unified U.S. African 
Combatant Command (USAFCOM). 
 
Recommendation 2:  Realign the Commander’s Area of Responsibility and 
create a sub-unified regional U.S. Sub-Saharan African Command 
(USSSAC) within USEUCOM 
 
Figure 14. This author’s changes after the Commander’s Area of 
Responsibility. The 2003-2004 USSOCOM SOF Posture Statement.  Retrieved 




Again, we must transform our conceptions of Africa so that our 
conceptions better fit our stated foreign policy.  The DoS and the DoD both 
recognize at the national policy level that Africa features natural and cultural 
separations at the Sahel, between North Africa (the Maghreb) and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Black Africa).  Nonetheless, there have been long-standing relations 
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between these regions and this is no more significant a divide than that between 
Sudan and Ethiopia, or between South Africa and Mozambique, for instance. 
Africa needs to be re-united on our eyes. 
At the very least, there needs to be U.S. unity of military command under 
one regional African command, similar to that of the U.S. Forces Command-
Korea (USFC) under USPACOM and the Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B) that 
regionally commands and controls all of Central America within USSOUTHCOM.  
A regional command assigned to Sub-Saharan Africa under USEUCOM will not 
jeopardize the current geo-political strategy between the U.S. and our European 
allies, partners, and coalitions.  Rather, this recommendation will create a better 
working relationship for the United Nations (UN) and provide better civil-military 
support to ongoing peacekeeping and humanitarian operations within Africa. 
Finally, the creation of a regional U.S. Sub-Saharan African Command 
would support future US-African foreign policy and U.S. national interests.  The 
creation of an U.S. Sub-Saharan African Command (USSSAC) could directly 
assist in improving African governance, state infrastructure, and regional 
capacity.  This initiative would be the ideal mechanism for coordinating 
diplomatic, economic, intelligence, security, and external foreign assistance.  The 











2. Recommend an Increase for Supporting African Union (AU) 
Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations in Support of U.S.-
African National Interests 
Africa Political 
 
Figure 15. Africa Political (Origination of this graphic illustration is unknown by 
this author) 
 
In America’s Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), foreign policy toward 
Africa has politically focused on helping Africans find African solutions to Africa’s 
problems.  The current Bush administration believes helping African leaders to 
eliminate Africa’s problems (i.e. bad governments, terrorism, ungoverned state 
territories, poverty, insurgencies, ethnic violence, weak state capacities and 
ineffective institutions, and HIV/AIDS) will strengthen state infrastructures and 
capabilities that will, in turn, deny safe havens for terrorists.  Africa’s civil wars 
and insurgencies have had a tendency to expand into regional conflicts, thus de-
stabilizing the entire region. 
The Bush administration has identified three strategic approaches to 
attaining our national security objectives in Africa: working with “anchor states” in 
each sub-region, supporting sub-regional organizations (SROs), and engaging 
the African Union (AU).  Out of these three approaches, supporting SROs is 
becoming an important strategic consideration for sub-regional organizations like 
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the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South African 
Development Community (SADC), and the East African Community (ECA) that 
have historically provided peacekeeping forces in support of regional security 
operations within Africa. 
However, many academics and Africanists within the Bush administration 
believe that sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS and SADC need to be 
strengthened further.  Dr Steven Metz, a leading research professor and 
chairperson for DoD Strategy and Plans at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at 
the U.S. Army War College, describes how problems between the states can 
impede such efforts: 
Despite widespread rhetorical support to territorial integrity 
and the inviolability of the borders inherited at the time of 
independence, most African borders are permeable, with only 
sporadic or weak control of the flow of people and goods from 
country to country.  This blurs the distinction between external and 
internal security problems.  Violence often pits an insurgent or 
secessionist movements against the central government or, 
increasingly, ethnic militias against governments or other groups.  
Many of these conflicts generate substantial refugee flows, thus 
turning internal violence into international problems.54 
Given the weakness of political institutions, personality plays 
a larger role in African affairs than in any other region of the world.  
Often, interstate cooperation or antagonisms reflect relations 
between individual “Heads of State” rather than national interests.  
Nowhere was that clearer than in 1996-97 war in Zaire/Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DROC), as many African leaders seized the 
opportunity to strike at Mobutu in revenge for his support of their 
enemies in the past.  Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, Rwanda’s Paul 
Kagame, and Angola’s Jose Dos Santos (among others) provided 
vital support to the rebels.  During the initial stages of the war, 
South Africa’s Nelson Mandela and Kenya’s President Daniel Arap 
Moi attempted to mediate.  Because of personal animosities, Moi 
excluded rebel leader Kabila, which virtually guaranteed failure.55 
                                            
54 Metz, Steven. Refining American Strategy in Africa. The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at 
the United Sates Army War College. Carlisle, Pennsylvania. February 2000, 8 
55 Ibid, Metz, Steven. Refining American Strategy in Africa. The Strategic Studies Institute 
(SSI) at the United Sates Army War College. Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 2000, 8 
55 
 The African Union (AU) regional and sub-regional organizations can only 
be as strong as their constituent states.  This, too we must keep in mind, but 
again here also mil-to-mil relations can help, especially when many leaders 
themselves are military men.56  If the current administration is truly intent on 
supporting AU regional and sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS, 
SADC, ECA, UMA, then the U.S. needs to pursue several strategies 
simultaneously, while to coordinate them effectively requires constant attention 
and unity of command. 
Meanwhile, even though anchor states such as Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia, 
Uganda, Morocco, and South Africa are extremely important in leading military 
interventions in Africa under UNPKO and Humanitarian Assistance missions, if 
the U.S. continues to focus too much political and military attention on finding, 
fixing, killing, and capturing terrorists, such attention will only foster animosity 
toward the United States.  Because of current U.S. national interests in Nigeria, 
Angola, Ethiopia, Uganda, Morocco, and South Africa, these countries are 
viewed by the other African states within their region as U.S. proxies.  Not only is 
a new long-term African regional strategy needed, but also an information 
operations (IO) campaign in order to successfully develop these regional and 
sub-regional organizations (SROs).  The U.S. should develop a long-term 
strategy in Africa that is not so much politically structured at promoting the most 
powerful country in the SRO, but develops the AU’s regional economic 
institutions and sub-regional security capabilities, and thus oversight of these 
SROs.  For this reason too, the Bush administration should focus more on 
developing the economies and state structures of all the AU member states in 
the SRO and not just the more powerful African regional hegemon. 
The final strategy for Africa is that the U.S. will need in the near term to 
shift our foreign policy focus toward properly addressing the threats from the 
underlying conditions of many weak and failing African states.  The U.S. will need 
to increase both the political role of the Department of State (DoS) and 
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encourage interagency support toward solving the realities of animosities, 
poverty, ungoverned territory and border areas, ethnic and racial violence, 
transnational crime, governmental corruption, and not continue to focus almost 
all efforts on terrorist man-hunting operations in support of the Global War On 
Terrorism (GWOT).  The U.S. will need a regional strategy that can focus more 
on the reform challenges in each African state. 
In conclusion, the U.S. will need to make sure that African solutions to 
African problems incorporate African states as partners.  The U.S. will need to 
implement a new U.S.-African foreign policy, emphasizing a larger supporting 
role for regional and sub-regional organizations.  If executed, this would signify to 
Africa’s leaders that the U.S. is committed to rational step-by-step approaches 









The United States should recognize the sub-regional diversity within 
Africa.  There are substantive differences, for instance, between West Africa and 
the Horn of Africa in terms of the numerous disputes over control of their borders, 
yet we have seen wars easily escalate in these sub-regions.  It is strategically 
vital that the U.S. recognize the need to plan, equip, train, execute, and support 
future nation building and ongoing peacekeeping operations and to establish 
proper border and regional security initiatives for the five African Union sub-
regional organizations (SROs).  Dr. Steven Metz from the Strategic Studies 
Institute (SSI) at the U.S. Army War College explains: 
While traditional, cross border, state on state warfare is rare 
in Africa; internal conflict arising from a struggle for control of the 
government is common and thus constitutes a major source of 
instability and insecurity.  In 1999, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Congo, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Burundi, Uganda, and Angola were all wracked by internal 
war.  Other long-standing conflicts were in hiatus but, capable of 
exploding at any time.  At the root is the struggle for power and 
resources, but ideology or ethnicity was often used to mobilize 
support and define “us” and “them.”  What makes these internal 
conflicts particularly debilitating is the tendency for them to become 
internationalized.57  
Today, the most pervasive security problem in Africa is what 
is called “complex emergencies” growing from the combination of 
weak states, ethnic tensions, and the combination of minorities, 
corrupt and dictatorial regimes, and support for these regimes by 
international arms traders, chronic poverty and underdevelopment, 
and the debt burden.  Complex emergencies do not entail 
traditional, force-on-force warfare, but sustained, low intensity 
(albeit often brutal) violence involving militias, warlord armies, state 
forces and, sometimes, private security forces. They are sometimes 
linked to environmental problems like drought or desertification and, 
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 epidemic disease.  Invariably, complex emergencies generate 
refugees who become both the victims of and pawns in the 
conflict.58 
The question for the United States and Africa is “How do we get there 
from here?  The short answer is that the U.S. should take a different foreign 
policy approach toward solving problems within Africa.  Essentially, the United 
States should either (1) step away from Africa all together, something that is 
politically and strategically impossible given the demands of the GWOT, or (2) 
become more geo-politically involved in U.S.-African regional and sub-regional 
affairs.  Given that the second option is the only one we can really afford, the 
U.S. will need to be more involved in Africa, especially since the Bush 
Administration is going to rely less on Middle Eastern energy resources and 
begin to rely increasingly on the Gulf of Guinea region for increased foreign oil 
imports.  Our current “hands-off” African foreign affairs approach can not be 
sustained.  Under such conditions, the U.S. needs to strategically invest in a 
national interagency long-term regional security cooperation plan in order to 
successfully assist the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organizations 
(SROs) to establish security and governmental capacity. 
At the same time, the U.S. needs to improve its strategic capability 
through improved regional intelligence (RI), support of ongoing UN 
Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) and AU regional and sub-regional security 
organizations, multilateral Counterterrorism (CT) cooperation.  In order to 
developing a preemptive regional SOF stance and increasing the much desired 
SOF regional CT capability in Africa, the U.S. will first need to develop better 
regional intelligence, emphasizing tribal language skills, and developing cultural 
experts within Africa.  In order to shape the operational preparation of the 
battlefield (OPB), provide greater regional human intelligence (HUMINT) access 
and expertise, support successful operational control elements (OCEs) and 
advance forces operations (AFO) requirements, the U.S. will have to strategically 
reorganize itself in Africa in order to better execute a long-term regional strategy. 
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The various U.S. military initiatives in Africa before September 11, 2001 
specifically in Western Africa and the Horn of Africa-such as the African Crisis 
Reaction Initiative (ACRI), African Contingency Operations and Training 
Assistance (ACOTA), OPERATION FOCUS RELIEF (OFR)-although sometimes 
tactically successful, failed politically and strategically. 
Post-September 11, 2001, the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative 
(EACTI), the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and, most recently the merging of the PSI 
into the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) are also achieving 
tactical and operational success, but are missing the mark politically and 
strategically.  They could be used to successfully support future US-Africa long-
term foreign policy and the GWOT.  However, nothing is being done to build on 
or out from them.  The moderate effectiveness of the CJTF-HOA, combined with 
the TSCTI in western Africa, would likely be more geo-politically effective if there 
was one unified U.S. military command structure that specified one trans-regional 
GWOT strategy in support of an integrated U.S.-African GWOT campaign 
strategy, especially one coordinated among all forms of U.S. power. 
The final conclusion is that if future North African or Sub-Saharan African 
counterterrorism initiatives are to continue, which certainly seems likely, then the 
U.S. should give a serious long-term look to what is needed for our military 
command structure in order to effectively support U.S.-African foreign policy.  In 
order to be successful in Africa, first the U.S. must get serious about how we 
currently geo-strategically align and organize in Africa.  The U.S. must 
acknowledge that a realistic geo-strategic change is needed for the near future in 
Africa in order to meet ongoing security threats and challenges. 
A dedicated geo-political organization is needed with full operational 
command and control over all of Africa that includes current USEUCOM, 
USCENTCOM, and USPACOM areas of responsibilities (AOR’s).  The U.S. will 
likely also need a forward-deployed SOF stance and a regional capability that 
enhances our cultural and linguistic intelligence.  As for what we need to do for 
Africa, the AU regional and sub-regional organizations need to be politically 
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recognized, adequately organized, professionally trained, specially equipped, 
and economically supported by a unified or sub-unified military organization that 





USSOCOM Operational Environments: 
 
1. Permissive Environments, where a friendly government or occupying 
power has authorized US military operations and has effective control of the 
territory and population in the operational area, and the capability and intent 
to assist the joint force effectively.  
 
2. Contested Environments, where-  
• A friendly government or occupying power has authorized US military 
operations but does not have effective control of the territory and 
population in the operational area, or the capability or intent to assist 
the joint force effectively; or  
• A hostile government or occupying power is opposed to US Military 
operations but does not have effective control of the territory and 
population in the operational area, or the capability or intent to oppose 
the joint force effectively. 
3. Ungoverned Environments, where no effective government exists to 
control the territory and population in the operational area or to assist or 
oppose the joint force effectively. 
 
4. Hostile Environments, where a hostile government or occupying power 
is opposed to US military operations and has both effective control of the 
territory and population in the operational area, and the capability and intent 
to oppose the joint force effectively.  
 
5. Denied Environments, where a friendly or neutral government is 
opposed to US military operations and has both effective control of the 
territory and population in the operational area, and the capability and intent 













Definitions of Changing DoD Security Environments:  
 
1. Traditional Challenges:  These challenges are most often associated 
with States employing armies, navies, and air forces in long-established 
forms of military competition.  Traditional military challenges remain 
important, as many States maintain capabilities to influence security 
conditions in their region.  However, allied superiority in traditional 
domains, coupled with the costs of traditional military competition, 
drastically reduces adversaries’ incentives to compete with the U. S. in 
this arena.59  
 
2. Irregular Challenges: Increasingly, sophisticated irregular methods –e.g., 
terrorism and insurgency—challenge U.S. security interests.  Adversaries 
employing irregular methods aiming to erode U.S. influence, patience, and 
political will.  Irregular opponents often take a long-term strategic 
approach, attempting to impose prohibitive human, material, financial, and 
political costs on the United States to compel strategic retreat from a key 
region or course of action.60  
 
3. Catastrophic Challenges: In the face of American dominance in 
traditional forms of warfare, some hostile forces are seeking to acquire 
catastrophic capabilities, particularly weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  
Porous International borders, weak International controls, and easy 
access to information–related technologies facilitate these efforts.  
Particularly troublesome is the nexus of International terrorists, 
proliferation, and problem States that possess or seek WMD, increasing 
the risk of a WMD attack against the United States.61 
 
4. Disruptive Challenges: In rare instances, revolutionary technology and 
associated military innovation can fundamentally alter long-established 
concepts of warfare.  Some potential adversaries are seeking disruptive 
capabilities to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and offset the current advantages 
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Department of Defense (DoD) critical insight into the methods needed to conduct 
global man-hunting operations. 
 
The Sixteenth Annual Strategy Conference conducted by the U.S. Army War 
College on April 12-14, 2005, at Carlisle, Pennsylvania.  The conference focused 
on current U.S. National security interests providing senior military leaders and 
advisors, leading universities and professors, media, and the policy making 
community to consider, discuss, and debate current topics concerning U.S. 
National Security Strategy (NSS) and to help frame vital questions that offer 
insights on "America’s Irregular Enemies: Securing Interests in an Era of 
Persistent Conflict".  American strategic leaders recognize that irregular enemies 
pose a significant and increasingly complex challenge for the United States and 
its international partners.  These include purposeful direct challengers who 
threaten the United States with terrorism as well as a host of other capable 
opponents who hold enduring American interests at risk by violently undermining 
the political stability of key strategic regions.  Irregular enemies may grow more 
capable over time. This strategic challenge requires conceptual innovation.  This 
is particularly important to help military and civilian leaders frame the issues for 
the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. The SSI conference website can be 
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